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Abstract 
 
 
1. Australia has performed quite well over the last two decades in terms of real GDP 
per head; the GDP gains have not been fully reflected in other economic welfare 
measures (section 1). 
 
2. Most economic reforms have important distributional effects, and these are often 
prolonged and enduring. Since distributional effects are an important dimension of 
economic welfare, they should be an integral part of the evaluation of policy reform 
(section 2). 
 
3. How can this be done? Some policy guidelines are proposed in the paper. There are 
practical and conceptual problems in applying these guidelines e.g. some value 
judgments are inevitable. However, these problems are not decisive (section 3).  
 
4. Two current policy issues (labour market reform and indigenous land rights) 
illustrate why it is important for economists to take distributional effects into account 
(section 4).  
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The Introduction  
 
Many public policy economists view a reform as economically desirable so long as it 
offers potential gains in excess of potential losses, irrespective of who gains or loses - 
i.e. if it enhances average real incomes per head it is a good reform. 
 
Yet we all know that economic reform is ultimately about improving economic 
welfare - and this encompasses much more than higher average real incomes per head. 
On a broader set of welfare criteria (including say quality of life and distribution), the 
justification for many of the major economic reforms of the last three decades is at 
least arguable. 
 
My paper is principally about the distributional dimension of economic welfare and 
how it can be made an integral part of the analysis of proposed economic reforms. 
 
It proposes a pragmatic set of guidelines for reconciling policy conflicts between 
equity and efficiency. 
 
These guidelines are then applied to two policy issues - labour market reform and 
land rights for Aborigines. 
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1. Need for a broader welfare evaluation of Australia's economic 
performance  
 
Purely in terms of real incomes per head - the conventional measure of economic 
performance - the Australian economy has performed creditably over the last two and 
a half decades. Real GDP per head increased by over 1/3 between 1972 and 1995 and 
this performance puts us somewhere in the top 10 in the OECD growth league. Over 
the last five years Australia's per capita growth performance ranks among the top five. 
 
GDP per head is however a very crude measure of economic welfare: we also need to 
take account of associated changes in income security, quality of life, the natural 
environment, and inter-personal and inter-generational distribution. When this is done 
the story is less rosy. 
 
It is evident for example that people perceive themselves to be more insecure - and 
they have reason to feel this way. With an underlying trend increase in unemployment 
(in part a reflection of improvements in labour participation rather than a slow-down 
in work opportunities) and increased use of part-timers, casuals and contract workers, 
many of the risks previously borne by owners of capital are now shared by workers.  
 
Relative to the more reformist Anglo-Saxon countries, although not relative to 
continental Europe, Australia has performed poorly on unemployment over the last 
two decades. We also make greater relative use of part-timers and casuals.  
 
It is also fair to say that the average quality of life (the non-market and non-material 
sources of enjoyment and happiness available to the population) has not improved in 
proportion with per capita incomes. 
 
While the last two decades have seen improvements in mortality rates, life 
expectancy, nutrition, housing standards, and educational attainment, and while on 
most quality of life indicators, Australia still ranks very high in the world (Castles 
1995, Gruen 1996), some aspects of our quality of life have definitely deteriorated -  
notably levels of noise, the incidence of child abuse and domestic violence, the 
suicide rate among our youth, the proportion of children suffering from asthma, the 
average hours worked per week by full-time employees, work satisfaction and morale, 
and the working conditions faced by part-time, casuals and out-workers.    
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On the basis of some broad indicators (the Human Development Index and the 
London Economist Nirvana), it appears that Australia's quality of life (measured by 
such things as life expectancy, literacy, longevity, school enrolment rates and crime 
rates) may have slipped relative to other countries. (On the Nirvana index we were 
ranked 3rd ten years ago and 7th now; and on the HDI we were ranked 8th and now 
we are 11th. However the data does not lend itself to such precision.) 
 
Similarly, our performance in protecting and improving our natural environment has 
been uneven, with the most serious deterioration being in the quality of our soil, 
inland waters and rivers, forests, in the oceans close to our major cities, and in levels 
of bio diversity and greenhouse emissions. 
 
And on the vexed question of whether we have been fair to future generations - or 
whether some of our improved GDP is at their expense - the jury is still out. I 
personally do not share the alarmist views of some, including the recent report of the 
National Audit Commission (1996), about the so-called fiscal burden we have been 
imposing on future generations (Argy, CEPR 1996). But it is arguable that we have 
allowed some of our economic and social infrastructure and human capital to run 
down, and we may not have made adequate income provision for future generations to 
compensate them for the exploitation of  depletable natural resources.  
 
Most importantly, what has happened to levels of  inequality? If one focuses on 
market incomes since the late 1970's, inequality has clearly increased (Saunders 1994 
and 1996, Nevile etc CEDA 1995, and Landt & Fischer 1996).  
 
The causes of this are varied and complex and include an increase in unemployment 
and in part-time relative to full-time jobs; trade liberalisation; the globalisation of 
production and growing competition from low wage developing economies; changes 
in technology and their impact on the relative demand for unskilled workers; 
demographic factors such as the ageing of the population; family breakdowns and an 
increase in single-parent families (partly the result of growing inequalities); and the 
swing to enterprise bargaining and decline in trade unionism, with the associated 
increase in male wage earnings dispersion (although in this latter respect Australia has 
not gone as far as other countries, like UK and NZ).  
 
Whilst increased inequality of market income has occurred in most OECD countries, 
the findings of the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) - which does not allow for 
differences in home ownership - place Australia towards the higher end of income 
inequality (EPAC 1995).  
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When you look at cash disposable incomes i.e. after-tax and after cash transfers, the 
picture in Australia is a little more reassuring, at least relative to countries with more 
radical reform agendas such as NZ, UK and US. Australian governments have used 
the tax/transfer system to partly neutralise the effects of market inequalities (Deborah 
Mitchell, CEDA 1995), whereas in NZ, for example, changes in the tax/transfer 
system reinforced rather than alleviated the regressive effects of developments in the 
market place. 
 
Even in disposable cash income terms, however, there has still been a slight trend 
increase in inequality in Australia (Harding 1996). It is almost certain that  
 
- the incidence of relative poverty, with the poverty line defined as 50% of average 
equivalent disposable income, has been on the increase in Australia (Saunders 1996); 
and 
 
- compared with other developed countries, Australia has a very high proportion of its 
children (14% according to UNICEF, Australian June 13 1996) living in families with 
inadequate incomes, and this situation seems to be getting worse. 
 
The evidence that disposable cash incomes (gross private incomes plus government 
direct benefits less personal income and indirect tax) have become more unequal is 
still subject to controversy (see Gruen/ Saunders debate in CEPR Discussion Paper 
and Johnson, Manning & Hellwig 1995, pp.17ff).  
 
But in any case this measure of income is incomplete. Improvements in non-cash 
benefits (the social wage), such as increases in government-funded family assistance, 
Medicare, child care and education, played an important role in the redistributive 
process in the 1980's.  
 
Once allowance is made for the non-cash social wage, it appears that if anything 
Australia was a less unequal society in the early 1990's than it was at the beginning of 
the 80's (Johnson, Manning & Hellwig 1995), although such results must be treated 
cautiously at this stage.  
 
So the shifts in income distribution over the last decade and a half do not on the whole 
provide cause for great alarm. However, it is likely that, in future the level of 
inequality will increase - for at least three inter-related reasons. 
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First, governments are becoming increasingly sensitive to the wishes and preferences 
of international fund managers and rating agencies because of the powers of 
international markets to destabilise the economy; international financial market 
participants understandably look for favourable developments on fiscal deficits, 
current account deficits, exchange rates, interest rates, inflation and asset prices; and 
are much less concerned about increases in unemployment and social inequality, or a 
deterioration in the quality of the urban and living environment. 
 
Second, we are witnessing another and possibly decisive onslaught of fundamentalist 
economic thinking in policy-making in Australia, with its overriding emphasis on 
efficiency and competitiveness goals and on reduced government intervention as a 
means of furthering these goals, irrespective of the income or regional distributional 
effects.  
 
Thirdly, in the new competitive jungle, we are seeing a hardening in community 
attitudes towards the disadvantaged and the unemployed - a "blame the victims" 
mentality. 
 
These developments might not hurt the very poor (those in "genuine" need according 
to some economic fundamentalists) but, if NZ is to be our model (OECD Survey of 
NZ p.70/71), they will certainly have two other effects on inequality: 
 
- the real disposable incomes of the lower income quintiles will decline markedly 
relative to the higher income quintiles; and 
 
- the social wage will tend to decline rather than increase.  
 
Consequently, unless there is an unexpectedly large  improvement in unemployment, 
the effective distribution of welfare (allowing for tax, cash transfers and the social 
wage) will almost certainly deteriorate significantly in the next few years. 
 
In this climate, the inadequacies of average real incomes as a measure of a nation's 
economic welfare will become increasingly evident to everyone.  
 
There is now a recognition that an increase in GDP needs to be discounted if it is at 
the expense of the natural or living environment. It is high time we also recognised 
the need to discount GDP gains when they entail adverse effects on income and 
employment security and welfare distribution. 
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One think tank based in San Francisco has tried to devise a "genuine progress 
indicator" (GPI), which captures output not traded in the marketplace, allows fully for 
environmental effects and depletion of resources, and places a higher weight on 
income if it is evenly distributed. On this basis they claim that GPI in the US has 
declined steadily and dramatically since the mid 1970's (Economist 30/9/95). 
 
I am not able to verify these estimates and from what I have seen I doubt that a similar 
conclusion would be reached in Australia (if one allows for the social wage effects); 
but they should make economists and governments pause and reflect whether we are 
approaching economic reform from too narrow an efficiency perspective.  
 
This is not to question the merits of micro economic reform. It is obvious there have 
been very substantial net welfare gains from improvements in efficiency, market 
flexibility and adaptability; and "by and large, higher real incomes are associated with 
an improved and not a reduced quality of life" (Gruen 1996). 
 
What it is legitimate to ask, however, is whether in future economic reform can 
achieve better overall welfare outcomes by giving greater weight to goals such as 
quality of life, lower unemployment and a more equal distribution of incomes, and 
trade off some real income per head against these other goals. 
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2. Why we should be taking account of distribution costs in 
evaluating economic reform 
 
My focus is on the distributional costs of economic reform, so I want to spell out 
more fully why we economists should be taking account of these distribution costs.  
 
That such costs exist few will deny. Most programs of economic reform, whether they 
involve labour market deregulation, commercialisation of the public sector, financial 
deregulation, fiscal consolidation or tax reform, can involve serious distributional 
costs. We know this on a priori grounds and we know it on the evidence of countries 
that have implemented such reforms.  
 
Moreover, the distributional costs are not necessarily just a transient phenomenon: on 
the basis of US, UK and New Zealand experience, it is obvious that the poor remain 
worse off (in absolute and certainly in relative terms) for a long time.  
 
Not only does reform have lasting effects on welfare distribution, but these 
distribution effects have in turn a very significant impact on aggregate economic 
welfare - for at least three reasons: 
 
 (i) if one accepts the common sense principle that the most basic needs are met 
first, it follows that a reform which takes $100 m. from low income families and gives 
$120 m. to higher income families does not necessarily increase total utility even if it 
increases total GDP; 
 
 (ii) relative poverty is usually coupled with unequal access to health, housing, 
education, the job market and the law; so it follows that increasing inequality 
produces increasingly unequal opportunity (and ability) to compete for market 
opportunities, which is not just a violation of basic freedom but also an economic 
efficiency distortion; a growing social gap also erodes trust and this too undermines 
the efficiency of markets; 
 
 (iii) in the long term the stability and cohesiveness of our society, and its 
willingness to accept further reform, can be undermined by growing inequality of 
incomes and opportunities; so a reform policy which is consistently and repeatedly 
insensitive to distribution effects has negative externality effects and might well be 
self-defeating (i.e it might fail to achieve even its limited objective of raising real per 
capita incomes) in the long term.  
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Many economists take the view that any economic reform which enhances GDP per 
head is good so long as  
 
- you have fair rules and processes in place and  
 
- it is possible for the winners from the reform to compensate the losers and still be 
better off than before.  
 
For reasons I have just indicated, I completely reject this view. Fair rules and 
processes are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for welfare maximisation. 
Indeed fair processes depend in part on fair outcomes: you cannot have fair rules and 
processes, including equal opportunity and respect for the law, in a society with large 
and growing inequalities of incomes and wealth.   
 
This does not mean that reform should always aim for distributional neutrality. Such 
an approach would be very stultifying for economic and social progress.  
 
But we should make distributional effects an integral part of any evaluation of 
economic reform, with the aim of getting as close as we can to an "optimal" balance 
between efficiency and equity. But how? 
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3. Policy guidelines which take account of distribution costs 
 
The approach I propose in my paper does not insist on distributional neutrality. It 
argues that some compromise between efficiency and equity may achieve a better 
welfare outcome than one focused solely on efficiency and that a reform which 
improves efficiency needs more analysis  before a final judgment can be made (Little, 
1960; Abelson, 1987).  
 
This compromise approach to reform involves five steps or  principles 
 
Principle 1: the evaluation of a proposed economic reform should not be based only 
on a comparison of starting and finishing points; account must also be taken of 
significant intermediate adjustment costs and the longer term benefits must be 
appropriately discounted to allow for these costs. (The NZ  reforms 1984-96 created 
such severe adjustment costs that, despite its strong economic performance in recent 
years, the NZ economy today has still not caught up with Australia relative to 1984.) 
 
Principle 2: an attempt should be made to estimate the longer term effects of the 
reform on welfare distribution and in particular seek to determine if the effects are 
likely to be "regressive" in the sense of  
 
- pushing a sizeable number of people below the poverty line (defined say as 50% of 
the mean equivalent family income); or 
 
- increasing appreciably the level of income inequality 
i.e. the gap between top and bottom quintiles. 
 
Principle 3: if the effects are likely to be regressive,  an attempt should be made to 
provide rough compensation to those considered to be relatively poor (those in the 
lowest quintile) - provided this is feasible and it can be done in a way which does not 
completely nullify the efficiency gains from the original proposal.  
 
What is an efficient and effective method of compensation? I would suggest that 
ideally five conditions must be met: 
 
- the losers must be fairly easily identified, so that the benefits are not wasted on 
unintended "outsiders" (e.g well-off landlords, managers and shareholders); 
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- the administration costs of the compensation process must be relatively low; 
 
- the method of compensation needs to be transparent to ensure accountability and 
review; 
 
- the instrument used must not generate too many by-product market distortions e.g. 
high effective marginal tax rates, which may seriously affect economic performance; 
and 
  
- the compensation policies should not simply provide passive support but should aim 
to facilitate labour market adjustment i.e. development of the skills and characteristics 
required for labour market integration. 
 
This points to the use of tax/transfer policy instruments, backed by active labour 
market programs as key instruments of compensation - in preference to the use of, 
say, regulation (whether of the financial system or wages) or protection, or cross-
subsidisation of utility prices.  
 
In the case of people thrown out of employment this may mean generous redundancy 
payments, adequate notice of retrenchment with adequate safeguards against unfair 
dismissal, personal counselling, job search, retraining and mobility assistance etc.  
 
In the case of people affected by public utility pricing reforms, it may mean vouchers 
or direct social security supplements.  
 
In the case of workers affected by lower wages and conditions, it may mean tax 
rebates or lump sum tax credits (guaranteed income) or improved community services 
(which have a strong equalising effect) or wage subsidies coupled with retraining and 
counselling programs. 
 
In the case of tax reforms (e.g a uniform GST), it may mean compensation through 
the welfare system. 
 
None of these devices are completely free of efficiency costs. Generally however the 
efficiency losses they might involve are likely to be small relative to the overall 
potential gains of reform.  
 
We come now to steps 4 and 5. These deal with the situation where compensation   
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- is not feasible (e.g. because it is difficult to identify the losers or because the 
benefits are likely to be captured by unintended people such as landlords or producers 
or because of community and political resistance to taxation) or  
 
- is not sensible (e.g. because of adverse incentive effects such as an increase in 
effective marginal tax rates). 
 
Principle 4 assumes that the equity costs are high relative to the reform. In that 
situation, given that compensation is not feasible or sensible, consideration should be 
given to the adoption of "softer" variants of the reform  program - e.g. phasing the 
reforms in gradually or introducing them only partially. 
 
This is often the situation policy advisers face e.g. radical labour market deregulation 
has potentially severe equity effects, yet compensation is not feasible in a policy 
environment which is striving to achieve fiscal consolidation and small government. 
And even if it were feasible it is not clear that a method of compensation can be 
devised which is both effective in terms of its target group (low-paid workers) and at 
the same time avoids high marginal effective tax rates. So a compromise to labour 
market reform is needed.   
 
Principle 5 assumes that the equity costs are small but the efficiency gains 
overwhelming. Here it is justifiable for the Government to proceed with reform 
despite distributional concerns - on the grounds that the total cake available for 
distribution will be much larger and will make up for the distribution costs.  
 
An example would be waterfront reform and reform of cabotage on coastal and trans-
Tasman shipping and many forms of tax reform (e.g the replacement of the existing 
hotch potch of federal and state indirect taxes with a uniform GST). 
 
The broad approach to economic reform outlined here - one which requires some 
efficiency benefits of reform to be sacrificed in order to avoid regressive distribution 
effects - is likely to be criticised from both ends of the ideological spectrum. 
 
The five main criticisms of this approach would be: 
 
- that it is too riddled with value judgments  
 
- that it would interfere with individual freedom 
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- that compensation policies have so many nasty by-product effects (on incentives, 
efficiency, saving etc) that they would leave everyone worse off 
 
- that it would slow down the whole reform process; and  
 
- that the underlying social objective (i.e. to avoid any further deterioration in the 
present relative position of the lowest income quintile) is too modest. 
 
The Right will tend to focus on the first four types of criticisms and the Left on the 
last. 
 
These concerns are understandable, and deserve a considered response. Briefly: 
 
-  the proposed approach does involve some value judgments, but so does the 
"efficiency first" fundamentalist approach; at least under this approach the value 
judgments are transparent and open to debate and the government is better informed 
as to the nature of the trade-off and the options available for resolving them; 
 
- the concern about freedom can be turned on its head: wide income and wealth 
inequalities and high concentrations of economic power are not consistent with 
equality of opportunity and access, and hence with true liberty of the individual and 
efficient markets (Rawls p.278); 
 
- certainly, some compensation mechanisms (especially the use of regulation or 
increased tax progressivity) can be damaging for efficiency and incentives; but 
generally if the right instruments are used, the effects are not likely to be substantial 
enough to weaken markedly the net economic benefits of a soundly-based reform; 
where available compensation mechanisms are likely to seriously damage economic 
incentives, my guidelines in effect suggest that the Government may have to look for 
a slightly diluted version of the reform or proceed with the reform without 
compensation; 
 
- as for delays to the reform process because of increased complexity of the policy 
formulation process, this is indeed a potential cost, but it must be weighed against the 
gains from improved transparency and understanding and from greater public 
acceptance of structural change;  
 
- the last concern is in my view justified but the question of what is a "fair" 
distribution of incomes and wealth and what should be done to develop a more "just" 
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society is too complex and judgmental for a modest economist to attempt: it is a 
separate issue altogether from the one addressed here, which is the incremental social 
welfare effects of a proposed economic reform. 
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4. Application to two current policy issues  
 
I now want to briefly apply my "pragmatic" guidelines to labour market reform and 
the issue of indigenous land titles. 
 
(a) labour market reform 
 
Labour market reform seeks to make room for greater  flexibility in work 
organisation, in human resource management and in wage structures. It's ultimate 
aims are: first, to make it easier to clear the market for unemployed (mainly unskilled) 
workers; and secondly, to improve productivity and competitiveness. (A third 
objective of labour market reform is to minimise inflationary pressures but it is 
outside the scope of this paper.) 
 
If governments want to achieve these aims they have four options (or some 
combination of all four): 
  
 (i) One option is to deregulate radically the labour market (including wages) 
without worrying at all about distributional effects. 
 
 (ii) A second option is to deregulate wages but introduce other economic 
reforms in tandem, so as to spread the gains and costs a little better e.g. more active 
labour market programs which assist the reintegration of disadvantaged unemployed 
persons into the labour force. 
 
 (iii) A third approach is to radically deregulate the labour market and accept 
the consequent increase in market inequalities, but partly compensate the working 
poor through the tax and transfer system and social wage e.g. through a guaranteed 
minimum income or income tax credit. 
 
 (iv) A fourth option is to adopt an incremental (rather than a big bang) 
approach to labour market reform i.e. go a partial way towards deregulation but 
maintain an industrial safety net and legal protection for trade unions, so as to limit 
the risk exposure of workers (such as to exploitation, abuse or a severe fall in living 
standards). 
 
Option (i) is the course broadly adopted in the UK and New Zealand and it is one that 
Australia might well move towards in the future. It is built on a system of individual 
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employment contracts, without the countervailing power of either trade unions or the 
IRC, and subject only to a very basic set of minimum wage and employment 
conditions.  
 
This option may do more for the economy than the other options. This is not because 
it improves factor productivity: both theory and the experience of countries like US, 
NZ and UK suggest that countries with deregulated labour markets do not achieve 
higher productivity growth. Rather it is because of what radical labour market 
deregulation does to the profit share, and hence the investment climate; and what it 
does to the inflation/unemployment trade-off.  
 
Under the Hawke-Keating governments, Australia adopted a mix of options (ii) to 
(iv). Like NZ, it allowed major improvements in functional flexibility (human 
resource management) at the enterprise level. However, unlike NZ,  
 
- Australia did not reduce and fragment the power of trade unions and force them to 
restructure on an enterprise basis;  unions in Australia remained largely occupational 
or industry-based and retained a strong negotiating position; and  
 
- Australia did not allow too much downward flexibility in pay and conditions; it 
maintained a strong award safety net, retained a regulatory body (the Industrial 
Relations Commission) to act as umpire and scrutineer, and relied for labour cost 
flexibility more on labour market programs (training, mobility assistance, wage 
subsidies etc) than on award wage flexibility.  
 
Could these differences between NZ and Australia on wage flexibility account for the 
better NZ employment performance in the 1990's? A priori one would expect a wage 
structure which responds to shifts over time in the demands for different types of 
labour to be less prone to structural unemployment (mismatch).  
 
And some OECD studies do back this a priori expectation: in the period 1980-1995, 
countries that have allowed a greater degree of wage dispersion (i.e. have allowed the 
relative wages of low-skilled workers to fall) have seen the smallest increases in 
unemployment (OECD 1996).  
 
However, what is also clear from the literature is that wage flexibility works better if 
it is also associated with pro-active labour market policies which improve levels of 
education, training and job readiness,  increase labour market information etc. 
(Economist 17/8/96).  
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Australia has relied mainly on pro-active labour market programs and only slightly on 
wage flexibility. NZ has relied mainly on a flexible wage structure and (at least until 
recently) only to a small extent on labour market programs. So one would expect the 
differences in labour market approach to account for some, but only a small part, of 
the difference in employment performance. 
 
Whatever their direct impact on employment (i.e. from drawing marginal or low 
productivity workers back into employment), the NZ labour deregulation measures 
undoubtedly had important indirect effects on employment. In particular they tended 
to produce a sharp redistribution to profits, a very friendly response from financial 
markets, a stable and positive investment and economic environment and a burst of 
animal spirits. 
 
In addition, the NZ labour market reforms, by deregulating the award structure and 
increasing the relative bargaining power of employers, helped, in conjunction with the 
increased credibility of monetary policy, to reduce inflation.  
 
So more because of its indirect than direct effects, NZ's radical approach to labour 
market reform probably did have beneficial employment effects.  
 
So there is no doubt that Option 1 offers some economic gains. But it has a social 
cost: it leads to an erosion of the living standards of a significant group of low-income 
workers, without any compensation. Even the OECD, in its Survey of the NZ 
economy, acknowledges that: 
 
"In the ten years to March 1994, the real disposable incomes of both the lower and 
middle-income quintiles have fallen in absolute terms by 4 and 5 per cent 
respectively, and it is only those of the highest income quintile which have risen" 
(OECD 1996 p.70). 
 
A reform which makes lower paid workers worse off and the rest of the community 
(especially higher paid workers, the self-employed, rentiers) much better off does not 
provide even the semblance of justice. Even in strict economic welfare optimising 
terms, the merits of such an approach are uncertain, given the costs imposed on those 
who are already relatively badly off. The political sustainability of the reforms in the 
long run can also be questioned. 
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The third option is theoretically the most appealing but may not be practical on its 
own in a world of fiscal balance, small government and concerns about high marginal 
effective tax rates.  
 
In my view, welfare optimisation is more likely to be achieved and justice served 
through a combination of the last three options rather than relying mainly on the first, 
as in NZ. 
 
It looks as if the present Government in Canberra has, like the previous one, rejected 
pure option (i); it is moving a little faster on incremental reform (option iv) but with 
less of (ii) and (iii) than the previous Government.  
 
(b) Competing land claims 
 
That a policy reform which enhances aggregate national production and incomes need 
not necessarily be welfare-enhancing can also be illustrated by reference to recent 
proposals to truncate by legislation the negotiating ambit and rights of Aborigines 
under the Native Title Act (NTA).  
 
The aim of such proposals - to rule out unsubstantiated ambit claims and to give 
miners and pastoralists more secure tenure - is understandable; but there is a fine 
balance here between ensuring that the genuine land rights of Aboriginal people are 
fully protected and giving miners and pastoralists reasonable access. Where should 
the balance be struck? 
 
To a fundamentalist - efficiency first - economist, the answer is clear. Preference 
should be given to miners and pastoralists because they can use the land more 
efficiently than traditional owners, and hence contribute more to GDP per head than 
Aborigines.  
 
Even at the pure efficiency level, the issues are not clear-cut. The kind of government 
intervention being proposed may increase rather than reduce uncertainty (unless 
taxpayers are asked to indemnify all mining projects potentially affected by future 
land title claims, which would hardly be reasonable).  
 
Again, if traditional owners are denied full property rights over non-land resources, it 
will have the perverse effect of making potential claimants less willing to allow 
mining to proceed since they could not hope to capture a share of the income from 
subsequent mineral exploitation. With full property rights, they may still decide, after 
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free and voluntary trade, to oppose mining; but if so it will be because they value the 
land for traditional uses more than it is worth for mining (Godden 1993).   
 
But a welfare economist will have two further, more decisive, objections. Leaving 
aside issues of fairness and legality e.g consistency with the Racial Discrimination 
Act, forcible intervention by the state to weigh the balance of market power in favour 
of miners and to exclude mineral rights from land titles may well produce a sub-
optimal welfare result. 
 
First, action to override the interests of indigenous Australians would have regressive 
income and wealth redistribution effects, as the Aborigines are on average worse off 
and have a higher marginal utility of money income than the mine owners. This 
would throw doubt on the net welfare effects of such action. 
 
Second, government intervention would have negative externality effects such as its 
impact on racial harmony and on our international reputation. Such externalities must 
clearly be taken into account in any overall cost-benefit assessment.  
 
There are further complications. It is now clear that as a result of the Mabo decision, 
certain legitimate expectations have been established which if disturbed would require 
compensation of losers: this applies both to aboriginals and to holders of pastoral 
leases. In such circumstances it is surely more sensible to allow free trade and 
exchange to determine the outcome without government intervention. 
 
The issues are complex, but they illustrate yet again that the fundamentalist efficiency 
school has too simplistic an answer to the really difficult social and economic reform 
issues of our day. 
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5. Concluding comments 
 
Economic reform is about improving economic welfare. An increase in real per capita 
incomes is often a necessary but seldom a sufficient condition of improved economic 
welfare. The effect on inequality is crucial to any assessment of a reform proposal. 
 
Beyond a point, labour market reform has a small and   uncertain impact on economic 
growth but a major impact (at least in the short term) on inequality, social stability 
and cohesion. Economists should therefore be guarded about advocating radical 
reforms in the dogmatic way they do. 
 
Similarly, constraining the negotiating powers of aboriginals over land rights can, 
beyond a point, involve a decline in economic welfare - no matter what it does to 
GDP.  
 
The perspective of economics on economic reform needs to be widened to make 
distributional effects an integral part of the analysis.  
 
If this sometimes involves value judgments, so be it. At least such judgments will be 
transparent. By ignoring distributional issues, economic fundamentalists are making 
interpersonal comparisons and value judgments too - but these are hidden.  
 
Regrettably the new Howard Government, by relying heavily on spending cuts rather 
than tax increases to curtail the budget deficit, by clawing back labour market 
programs, by directly or indirectly reducing the social wage, and by reducing 
unemployment and other lower income benefits, is moving to implement at least some 
of the fundamentalist philosophy. 
 
Perhaps it correctly senses the public mood. The "fair go, mateship" mentality is 
coming under increasing stress in a competitive market place which "produces a 
psychological environment of anonymity, indifference to others, mobility, lack of 
commitment, and autonomy" (Bowles, quoted in Harcourt 1992).   
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